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Critics of religious exemptions view them as “exit rights” or euphemisms for 
discrimination, undermining our shared social commitment to civil rights and 
our aspiration to secure equal citizenship for everyone. This Comment responds 
by arguing that so-called “exit rights” are, in fact, an appropriate and necessary 
application of pluralism—itself one of our society’s shared aspirational commit-
ments. America’s commitment to pluralism requires us to respect the dignity 
within each enclave of religious society.  
 
Our policymakers undermine that respect if they adopt an inferior view of 
pluralism, which attempts to replicate the composition of society writ large 
within each religious enclave. This Comment connects these competing visions 
of pluralism to recent controversial applications of Religious Freedom 
Restoration Acts, and uses the competing visions as a lens to analyze high-profile 
state religious liberty bills in Georgia and Mississippi. Such debates inevitably 
raise questions about how states would respond to racial discrimination posed 
as religious belief, but racial slippery slopes are inapposite to modern religious 
liberty claims. Finally, well-crafted, pluralistic religious liberties laws can 
respect the autonomy of religious exercise while properly securing equal 
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Religious liberty is a triumph of Western liberalism. For most of 
American history, freedom of religion as a concept evoked pride rather than con-
troversy.1 In the years since the Supreme Court shifted the culture wars’ balance 
of power with United States v. Windsor2 and Obergefell v. Hodges,3 however, the 
phrase evolved into a hot-button political issue.4 To some audiences, “religious 
liberty” is now little more than a euphemism for discrimination.5 Exemptions 
																																								 																				
1 See Mary Ann Glendon, First of Freedoms? How Religious Liberty Could Become a Second-
Class Right, AMERICA MAG., Mar. 5, 2012, http://americamagazine.org/issue/5131/article/first-
freedoms (“Until recently the status of religious liberty as one of the most fundamental rights of 
Americans has seldom been seriously challenged.”). 
2 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2675-76 (2013) (striking down the Defense of 
Marriage Act). 
3 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (striking down state law that precluded 
same-sex marriage). 
4 See, e.g., Jonathan Merritt, Religious-Liberty Laws That Have No Meaning, ATLANTIC 
(Apr. 28, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/04/religious-liberty-law 
s-that-have-no-meaning/480297/ (providing a social liberal’s view of the general trend of 
social conservatives to utilize religious-liberty laws and warning that such laws promote even 
more resistance to religion and conservative values). 
5 See, e.g., ACLU, End the Use of Religion to Discriminate (last visited May 6, 2016), 
https://www.aclu.org/feature/using-religion-discriminate (“With increasing frequency, we 
are seeing individuals and institutions claiming a right to discriminate – by refusing to 
provide services to women and LGBT people – based on religious objections . . . . [R]eligion 
is being used as an excuse to discriminate against and harm others.”). 




from general laws to protect religious liberty now appear to clash against 
society’s shared commitments to nondiscrimination and equal citizenship. 
 Critiques of modern religious liberty claims come principally in two 
forms. First, critics like Professor Robin West decry the loss of social unity.6 
Specifically, she argues that religious exemptions amount to “exit rights” that 
undermine our shared social commitment to civil rights, thus imposing a 
brutal cost on society.7  Second, scholars like Professors James Fleming and 
Linda McClain argue that, at least in some circumstances, religious exemp-
tions could threaten our constitutional culture’s guarantee of equal citizenship 
to all people.8 
 This Comment responds to the first group of critics by arguing that so-
called “exit rights” are, in fact, an appropriate and necessary entailment of 
pluralism—itself one of our society’s shared aspirational commitments. In res-
ponse to the concerns of the second group, this Comment sketches out specific 
ways to craft religious exemptions to generally applicable laws to minimize the 
cost of liberty against equality. These suggestions are humble, fully acknow-
ledging that difficult tradeoffs will always remain, so no compromise can 
satisfy every concern. But in a world where religious exemptions do indeed 
exist, exemptions are not all created equally.9 Even the harshest critic can 
acknowledge that some formulations pose less risk to our shared civil rights 
commitment than others. 
																																								 																				
6 Robin West, Freedom of Church and Our Endangered Civil Rights: Exiting the Social 
Contract, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (Zoe Robinson et al., eds.), 
(forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 8), http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcont 
ent.cgi?article=2489&context=facpub; see also Mary Anne Case, Why "Live-and-Let-Live" Is 
Not A Viable Solution to the Difficult Problems of Religious Accommodation in the Age of 
Sexual Civil Rights, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 463, 480 (2015) (providing a similar but less compelling 
argument on the tension between religious accommodation and sexual civil rights). 
7 West, supra note 6, at 9-23. 
 
Exit rights generally give their holders rights to exit from societal and civic 
obligations that would be otherwise imposed upon them by the state and 
to retreat instead into miniaturized sub-cultural worlds, in which the 
authority of the federal or state governments is set aside, so as to permit 
the flowering of a different and more private sovereign authority.  
 
Id. at 9. 
8 JAMES E. FLEMING & LINDA C. MCCLAIN, ORDERED LIBERTY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, 
AND VIRTUES 146 (2013). 
9 Traditional RFRA laws are far more restrained than more recent state legislation, and 
specific provisions differ greatly state-by-state. See infra Part VI (providing a more extensive 
analysis of relevant new state legislation on religious freedom).  
 




 Past commentators, especially Professor Robin Fretwell Wilson, pro-
posed exemption regimes framed as compromises.10 In fact, Utah lawmakers 
sought out her insight and help in drafting state law that incorporated such 
exemption regimes.11 Such “compromises” warrant fresh examination in light of 
recent controversy over state religious liberty bills, including the heated debates 
in Mississippi and Georgia.12 This Comment will specifically examine these 
state proposals, highlighting what religious exercise they properly protected, 
where they went astray, and how other states should approach similar conflicts. 
As with any discussion of religious exemptions, we must acknowledge the 
looming counter-example of race. Ultimately, that means considering how states 
would respond to a request for religious exemptions to racial nondiscrimination 
laws. Finally, this Comment concludes on a positive note by considering a 
potential solution for states that want to protect religious liberties while 
expressing appropriate commitment to civil rights and equal citizenship. 
 
I. RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS: PLURALISM OR SOCIETAL FRACTURE 
 
A. The Societal Critique 
 
 Professor Robin West presents her critique of religious liberty exemp-
tions in a societal context. Religious organizations make internal decisions 
about their own composition and behavior, but these decisions do not exist in 
a vacuum. All participants in civil society feel the repercussions of religious 
practices, and some people suffer at the hands of religiously-motivated 
behavior that receives state protection. She posits: 
																																								 																				
10 Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Calculus of Accommodation: Contraception, Abortion, Same-
Sex Marriage, and Other Clashes Between Religion and the State, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1417, 
1418 (2012). 
11 See S.B. 296, 2015 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2015) (advancing nondiscrimination protections for 
LGBT people in Utah while including religious liberty carve-outs); Jennifer Dobner, ‘I’m 
Going to Sign the Bill’: Utah Gun Lauds Compromise of Religious Liberty, LGBT Protect-
ions, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Mar. 7, 2015), http://archive.sltrib.com/story.php?ref=/home/22 
53822-155/mormon-backed-an (describing how Utah senators asked for Robin Fretwell 
Wilson’s assistance on S.B. 296 and explaining that Wilson helped to draft the bill). 
12 See, e.g., Camila Domonoske, Here’s Why Mississippi’s ‘Religious Freedom’ Bill is So 
Controversial, NPR (Apr. 1, 2016), http://n.pr/1SFgubE (reporting on lawmakers’ approval of 
Mississippi’s “Protecting Freedom of Conscience from Government Discrimination Act,” 
supporters’ view of the bill as appropriate protective of religious rights, and critics’ view of the 
bill as allowing state actors to discriminate against LGBT people); Merrit Kennedy, Georgia Gov. 
Says He Will Veto Controversial ‘Religious Liberty’ Bill, NPR (Mar. 28, 2016), http://www.npr. 
org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/03/28/472134459/georgia-gov-says-he-will-veto-controversial-
religious-liberty-bill (discussing similar controversy surrounding Georgia’s religious liberty bill 
and resulting company boycotts of the state, particularly in the film industry). 




 The core of my objection that freedom, then, is just this: we 
should remember that what is jettisoned when we enshrine the 
“Freedom of the Church” in the constitutional canon is not . . . 
just the occasional right of employees in ministerial positions 
in church-affiliated places of employment to a remedy for their 
wrongful discharge. What is jettisoned, rather, is the aspiration 
of a civil rights society in a much larger sense. It is the aspir-
ation for an understanding of rights as being rights to enter 
rather than rights to exit—rights to be included, and to 
participate in all aspects of our social, civic, and constitutional 
identity. When we set aside our civil rights to enter in order to 
make room for a Church’s freedom to exit, we are setting aside 
not only a particular litigant’s right to relief for a wrongful 
discharge, but also a particular conception of our rights trade-
tion. We are setting aside an understanding of rights and a 
history of rights that seeks to secure, on behalf of every one of 
us, entry into the socially and legally constructed civic worlds 
of work, school, commerce, family, the public square, the 
courthouse, and neighborhood.13 
 
 Professor West couches her social goals in policy language with a 
presupposition that the state is the proper actor to secure entry into these civic 
worlds. Her language allows virtually no room for religious practice that is free 
from government supervision if the practice in question denies access to some 
people. But our history of protecting individual rights is not so state-centric, and 
therefore does not offer the state such a powerful entrée into private religious 
relationships.14 In dealing with a sphere of private actors assembling for 
religious purposes (as in Hosanna-Tabor, Professor West’s foil for her argu-
ment), her policy prescription amounts to state-licensed religious beliefs.15 To 
																																								 																				
13 West, supra note 6, at 30. 
14 See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION 23 (2016) (“A Republican 
Constitution views the natural and inalienable rights of these joint and equal sovereign 
individuals as preceding the formation of governments, so first come rights and then comes 
government. Indeed, the Declaration of Independence tells us, it is to ‘secure these rights’ 
that ‘Governments are instituted among Men.’”) (emphasis in original).  
15 See West, supra note 6. Well-meaning egalitarians would balk at the language of state-
licensed religious beliefs, but that is the natural consequence of crowding out private religious 
beliefs as a protected sphere. Because all private religious beliefs create public externalities, 
Professor West’s worldview effectively makes all private religious behavior public. It could 
therefore be ripe for regulation on preferential policy grounds, as we see in Professor West’s 
egalitarian policy argument against religious freedom in church hiring decisions. 




adopt her vision would be essentially statist. Rights function as trump cards to 
preserve individual interests against majoritarian preferences.16 The individual 
thus thwarts collective interest, preventing further engagement even when 
collective welfare could be advanced.17 The church whose rights Professor 
West disparages did not step outside of its sphere; it did not act as a for-profit 
corporation engaging in commercial enterprise, but rather as a non-profit 
religious organization. Churches are not public transportation buses. Religious 
charities are not public corporations. Such groups reflect a necessary outflow of 
what John Stuart Mill labeled the “inward domain of consciousness.”18 The state 
may validly respect the autonomy of religious organizations, and doing so entails 
protecting their societal sphere from some external controls and coercion.  
 Ultimately, Professor West advances a normative goal about social 
order. By using the power of government to foist particular hiring practices 
upon a congregation, or dictate any other practice of any other religious organi-
zation, the government could indeed ensure equal rights to enter. It would also 
ensure the loss of vibrant pluralism.19 Our civil society functions with diverse 
religious enclaves, from horseback transportation in Amish Country to Islamic 
schools in Dearborn, Michigan. James Madison called this diversity the 
“multiplicity of sects.”20 To preserve that diversity, policymakers must not 
reflexively use the power of government to establish a preferred social order 
within religious organizations. 
 Because of our longstanding respect for the autonomy of worshippers 
to observe their own practices and religious behavior, we do not seek to 
impose certain criteria for entry or practice unless it violates the rights of 
																																								 																				
16 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 205 (1977) (“The bulk of the 
law—that part which defines and implements social, economic, and foreign policy—cannot 
be neutral. It must state, in its greatest part, the majority’s view of the common good. The 
institution of rights is therefore crucial, because it represents the majority’s promise to the 
minorities that their dignity and equality will be respected. . . . If the government does not 
take rights seriously, then it does not take law seriously either.”) (emphasis added). 
17 Id. 
18 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 26 (1859) (“This, then, is the appropriate region of 
human liberty. It comprises, first, the inward domain of consciousness; demanding liberty of 
conscience, in the most comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and feeling; absolute 
freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, 
or theological.”). 
19 E.g., id. at 13 (“Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough: 
there needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against 
the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and 
practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them[.]”). 
20 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (“In a free government the security for civil 
rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the 
multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects.”). 




others.21 If a religious cult demanded ritual abduction as part of its religious 
practice, the state would not defer to the cult’s autonomy, prioritizing instead 
the state’s responsibility to protect rights.22 In Professor West’s conception, the 
same rule holds for protecting the right of equal access. All decisions by a 
religious organization, or by a religious family with a business, inevitably 
affect other people. No religious practice is therefore truly private. Social 
conservatives made similar arguments about morality, suggesting that private 
moral acts undermine a shared moral ecosystem such that no moral acts are 
truly private.23 Here, no religious exercise is truly private, because they affect 
our ecosystem of shared civic aspirations.24  
 But any religious organization must have more autonomy in 
determining entry into its own assembly than West’s conception contemplates. 
Simply because someone is part of a society, and thus enjoys some societal 
benefits, does not grant the state authority to micromanage it. A pastor declin-
ing to officiate a same sex marriage or a church denying access to its 
multipurpose outdoor facility for the same marriage must be treated differently 
than if the church blocked access to another facility the congregation did not 
own.  Our aspiration to pluralism demands that much respect.  
 
B. The Equal Citizenship Critique 
 
When religious groups seek exemptions from civil rights laws, their 
accommodations often “collide[] not only with general public policies . . . but 
also clash[] with antidiscrimination norms that are as normatively supported as 
																																								 																				
21 See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313, 
319 (2013) (“The coercive powers of government include its powers to allocate money, 
licenses, privileges, and the like in discriminatory ways. The principle that government should 
not coerce religious beliefs or behaviors necessarily entails the proposition that government 
should not create incentives to change religious beliefs or behaviors — that government should 
be neutral with respect to religion in all its regulation, taxation, and spending.”). 
22 See, e.g., MILL, supra note 18, at 140 (“Acts injurious to others require a totally different 
treatment. Encroachment on their rights [or] infliction on them of any loss or damage not 
justified by his own rights . . . are fit objects of moral reprobation, and, in grave cases, of 
moral retribution and punishment.”). 
23 See, e.g., Robert P. George, Forum on Public Morality: The Concept of Public Morality, 
45 AM. J. JURIS. 17 (2000). 
24 See West, supra note 6, at 3 (“To discriminate in employment in violation of those laws, 
then, is not simply an act that may give rise to a cause of action for reinstatement or damages, 
as per Justice Roberts’s suggestion. It is also to break faith with and to undermine the shared 
national project of creating a world of equal opportunity and full participation that is free of 
racism and sexism and their related effects, and it is to perform an individual moral wrong 
in one’s personal contractual relations with one’s employees or with those who seek one’s 
employment.”). 




religious freedom.”25 Churches and religious institutions are among the 
nongovernmental associations that offer “seedbeds of virtue” that “guard 
against governmental orthodoxy by generating their own distinctive virtues 
and values.”26 Professors James Fleming and Linda McClain explain that 
these associations are sometimes congruent with the goals of public policy, 
but other times they stand athwart the values promoted by civil government.27 
Fleming and McClain draw a common distinction between commercial and 
noncommercial activity.28  
Religiously-motivated individuals thus forfeit at least some of their free 
association rights when they choose to enter a commercial market with its 
embedded nondiscrimination rules.29 This framework follows a stated goal of 
avoiding absolutism “of one liberty to the exclusion of other constitutional 
commitments.”30 Toward that end, it protects some religious practices of indivi-
dual clergy and church teachings, but in other contexts, a “head-on clash of civil 
rights—between freedom of religion and freedom from discrimination” must 
come down in favor of nondiscrimination to “secur[e] the status of equal citizen-
ship for everyone.”31 With this priority in mind, religious exemptions are best 
characterized as a “prudential mutual adjustment” or “interim remedy” rather 
than an intrinsically valuable protection of individual liberty in its own right.32  
 Some aspects of equal citizenship will always lie in a tradeoff with 
liberty of conscience. If a minister declines to officiate a same-sex ceremony, 
the wedding couple is thereby denied equal treatment. But few people would 
be despotic enough to force the minister to officiate the wedding, so we are left 
with a line-drawing problem on the spectrum of conscience. Professors 
Fleming and McClain urge a mutual adjustment of values by which both sides 
yield. The question still turns, however, on the point at which someone’s liberty 
of conscience must yield. Because that question lacks an easy answer, statutory 
liberty of conscience protections typically rely on a “least restrictive means” 
requirement.33 This standard bars the government from substantially burdening 
																																								 																				
25 Martha Minow, Should Religious Groups Be Exempt from Civil Rights Laws?, 48 B.C. L. 
REV. 781, 786 (2007). 
26 FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 8, at 146. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 173-74. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 148. 
31 Id. at 173 (internal quotations omitted). 
32 Id. at 174. 
33 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012) (“Government may substantially burden a person's 
exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person (1) is 
in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of 
furthering that compelling governmental interest.”). 




the exercise of religion unless it can demonstrate a compelling government 
interest for doing so, and uses the least restrictive means to achieve that 
compelling interest.34 As a general rule, requiring the government to use least 
restrictive means imposes a burden on the appropriate party. If the state must 
interfere with religious practice, it should bear some obligation to use that 
power reluctantly out of respect for our shared constitutional commitment to 
liberty of conscience and pluralism.  
 The commercial/non-commercial distinction offers help in many 
situations, but sometimes it does not answer questions of responsibility. A 
wedding photographer is a member of the commercial market, and enjoys 
benefits of the legal system given to companies. Nonetheless, incorporation 
documents do not shield the photographer from moral culpability for every 
decision he or she makes. A photographer does not share decision-making 
power with a board of directors or managers. If the government requires him 
or her to participate in someone else’s religious ceremony by serving a mar-
riage, that may involve compelled practice against his or her religion while still 
being commercial.  
 Professor John Inazu, himself a supporter of religious exemptions, 
suggests that the commercial/non-commercial distinction is purely pragmatic.35 
To a large degree, it probably is just that. However, it also reflects the unique 
role that churches and religious institutions play as seedbeds of virtue in 
American culture and history. Religious institutions can rationally receive more 
deference, or at least, demand a closer review of state action when it encroaches 
on their religious exercise. Companies, by contrast, lack that historic purpose and 
institutional role as seedbeds of virtue, so corporations can warrant more scrutiny 
in a religious claim, with a policy basis deeper than simple pragmatism.  
 The least restrictive means requirement may be instructive here too. 
Professor Robin Fretwell Wilson makes the case for protecting the religious 
practice of wedding cake bakers and photographers when the victims of such 
practices—the couples denied equal citizenship—have readily available 
alternatives.36 If the burden on religious exercise is not necessary, then the 
government should not force the issue. Why sue the one photographer who 
opposes same-sex marriage, compelling him or her to facilitate a wedding, 
when many others would happily accept the business?  
Of course, critics could pose a similar question the other way, 
highlighting the burden on a couple seeking marriage: Why must an LGBT 
couple suffer the embarrassment, stigma, and hassle of finding another 
																																								 																				
34 Id. 
35 John D. Inazu, A Confident Pluralism, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 587, 594-95 (2015). 
36 Wilson, supra note 10, at 1485-89. 




provider simply to placate someone else’s religion?37 Professor Mary Anne 
Case considers this the only noteworthy burden, waving away any burden on 
religious beliefs as paling under the “troubling asymmetry” of cost to the 
person seeking to compel service.38 An important difference remains, however, 
between harm and aggression.39 Someone suffers a dignitary harm in both 
instances, but only the harm against liberty of conscience is compelled by the 
government. Unlike religious exemptions that consider whether alternatives 
are available, when governments mandate individuals to participate in a 
religious ordinance (such as a wedding) with which they disagree, the state 
action constitutes a form of aggression without recourse to any alternatives. 
 If no one else is available to fill the religious objector’s role, then the 
state might compel the photographer’s participation to ensure the couple’s 
equal citizenship. Professor Wilson also applies this logic to public officials 
providing marriage licenses.40 She would protect the conscience of a county 
clerk to avoid participation as long as someone in the office was available to 
sign a same-sex marriage license. This exercise of religious expression, 
however, cannot fall under the same justification as religious individuals and 
organizations. No live-and-let-live solution is available when a public official 
refuses to follow public policy. Unlike a minister or wedding photographer, 
county clerks and similar officials choose to inject themselves into the 
administration of public laws, and thus lose the right to evaluate the 
administration of each law against their personal religious convictions. We 
apply this logic, for example, when we extend an opportunity for conscientious 
objection to those drafted by the military, but not to a services member who 
volunteers to join the special forces, then declines a mission because of 
personal moral qualms.  
 In short, someone will assume a dignitary burden in these clashes 
between the law and religious practice. But only one party seeks to coerce the 
other into submission. The photographer is willing to embrace a live-and-let-
live arrangement, in Professor Doug Laycock’s parlance.41 In an era of legalized 
																																								 																				
37 The other obvious counterexample is that we would never permit racial discrimination on 
the basis that other businesses would want the business. Race is addressed separately in this 
Comment. See infra Part VII (discussing the differences and similarities between race 
discrimination and discrimination based on sexual orientation). 
38 Case, supra note 6, at 480. 
39 See generally Stephanie Slade, Why the Best Arguments Against Religious Liberty Should 
Still Be Rejected, REASON (Nov. 13, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://reason.com/blog/2015/11/ 
13/the-best-arguments-about-religious-liber. 
40 Wilson, supra note 10, at 1479-81. 
41 See Douglas Laycock, Sex, Atheism, and the Free Exercise of Religion, 88 U. DET. MERCY 
L. REV. 407, 429-30 (2011) (“[T]he conflicts between believers and nonbelievers, and 




gay marriage and rapidly solidifying popular support for LGBT rights, the 
indignities a photographer can inflict upon a wedding he or she does not attend 
are limited. If the state forces action by the photographer, however, the live-
and-let-live arrangement is upended, ignoring all dignitary interests of some-
one’s religious expression, as well as the pluralistic respect for their own 
practice. Live-and-let-live is little more than a euphemism for liberty.42 To 
understand this liberty in context, it’s worth asking whether religious exemptions 
comport with the spirit of free exercise claims at all. 
 
II. MODERN RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS VERSUS FREE  
EXERCISE OF RELIGION 
 
 Do modern religious liberty debates bear any relationship to the historic 
roots of religious liberty? At first glance, questioning whether religious organ-
izations should be bound by nondiscrimination laws may not seem analogous 
to citizens’ right to practice the religion of their choice. In at least one sense, 
however, they share a common moral basis of pluralism. Just as exit rights 
today undermine the social unity of our aspirational values, exit rights for 
religious minorities in confessional states diluted the shared national commit-
ment to which those nations aspired. That shared national commitment was 
misplaced, no doubt, but it was a shared social project and religious exit rights 
weakened it. 
 In the eighteenth century, the American constitutional project sought to 
replace the social unity of a confessional state with a republican society that 
respected liberty of conscience.43 Their predecessors in Europe still compelled 
their subjects to embrace particular religious confessions in order to be a citizen 
in good standing of a nation. These confessional states begat the Book of 
Common Prayer, compulsory church attendance, and publicly-financed 
churches.44 More important than any particular religious practice, these societal 
expectations demonstrated a shared social commitment to certain ideas.45 
																																								 																				
between religious conservatives and the gay rights movement, have live-and-let-live 
solutions in the tradition of American liberty.”). 
42 See generally id. 
43 See John Witte Jr., Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion in the American Constitu-
tional Experiment, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 371, 388-94 (1996).  
44 See generally Philip S. Gorski, Historicizing the Secularization Debate: Church, State, 
and Society in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe, CA. 1300 to 1700, 65 AM. SOC. 
REV. 138, 157 (“During the Confessional Age, the lines between temporal and religious 
authority became increasingly blurred, both in principle and in fact.”). 
45 See generally BRENT F. NELSEN & JAMES L. GUTH, RELIGION AND THE STRUGGLE FOR 
EUROPEAN UNION: CONFESSIONAL CULTURE AND THE LIMITS OF INTEGRATION (2015). 




 Dissenters—be they Muslim, Jewish, atheist, Roman Catholic, or pro-
testant—needed exit rights from the existing social contract.46 The aspirations 
of civic identity in Elizabethan England simply did not comport with the 
individual religious identity of Roman Catholics, nor was the French consti-
tutional identity under Louis XIV compatible with the personal religious 
identity of Anabaptists.47 Religious minorities sought, in a sense, an exit right. 
They wanted to freely exercise their religion, to freely assemble with fellow 
believers, to secure a liberty of conscience that undercut their society’s shared 
social commitments. The First Amendment provides just such a space.48  
 The American constitutional project expresses a commitment to 
religious exercise, facilitated by liberty of conscience.49 Historically, the 
United States emerged from a European civic culture that preferred social unity 
in the form of a confessional state over personal liberty of conscience.  The 
First Amendment inverts that hierarchy, explicitly protecting religious exercise 
rather than articulating a vision of social unity.50 That does not mean the 
founders saw no social value in religion, such as fostering public virtue, but the 
right to free exercise of religion is not explicitly predicated on such aims. By 
opting for liberty of conscience, the framers expressed a values preference that 
is transferable to modern contexts. In today’s debates, religious liberties are not 
pitted against state religion. Instead, they increasingly stand athwart nondiscri-
mination ordinances that reflect our shared social commitment to civil rights 
and equal citizenship. Depending on the social norms and shared societal 
commitments of any generation, liberty of conscience may entail the right of 
believers to exit those shared commitments.  
 Following the American model, governments across the world shifted 
their religious paradigms. Hundreds of statutes and constitutional measures 
across the world enacted in recent decades afford new protections to religious 
																																								 																				
46 See Gorski, supra note 44, at 158 (“Thus, in the Confessional Age, one's access to the 
public sphere, and even one's membership in the community, were largely dependent upon 
one's (professed) religious views — a de-differentiation of the religious and the secular.”). 
47 See id. at 158-59 (“The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries witnessed mass movements of 
religious refugees, a sort of confessionally driven Volkerwanderung in which Protestants 
drove out Catholics, Catholics drove out Protestants, and everybody drove out the Baptists 
and other ‘sectarians.’”). 
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49 See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of 
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1427 (1990) (arguing that American history demonstrates a 
longstanding commitment to religious exemptions); but see Philip A. Hamburger, A 
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rights, including “generous protections for liberty of conscience and freedom 
of religious exercise,” along with “guarantees of religious pluralism” and 
“other special protections and entitlements for religious individuals and 
religious groups.”51 
 Protecting religious exercise incongruent with the government’s 
preferred social orthodoxy thus comports with our First Amendment constitu-
tional culture. Dissenting in Dennis v. United States, Justice Hugo Black argued 
that the First Amendment is a keystone of our government because it protects all 
viewpoints, not merely those consistent with Congressional majorities.52  Such 
an approach is “not likely to protect any but those ‘safe’ or orthodox views which 
rarely need [First Amendment] protection.”53 
  Today, our shared national commitment to civil rights is noble and 
accepted, while confessional states are mostly confined to a few pockets in the 
Middle East. But the impulse for societal unity and shared commitments 
transcends generations, and the value of vibrant religious pluralism stands the 
test of time. 
 
III. COMPETING VISIONS OF PLURALISM 
 
Given our society’s shared commitment to civil rights, how should we 
handle dissenters? For those who embrace a total win approach on both the left 
or the right, a confident pluralism that embraces intellectual diversity falls flat. 
Prominent Harvard Law School Professor Mark Tushnet embodies the “they 
lost, we won” approach.54 In dealing with “losers,” Professor Tushnet rejects 
any accommodations for cultural conservatives, a group whose perspective he 
judges to lack any “normative pull.”55  
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Rights in Global Perspective, 42 WM. & M. L. REV. 707, 709 (2001). 
52 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 580 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting) (“I cannot agree 
that the First Amendment permits us to sustain laws suppressing freedom of speech and press 
on the basis of Congress' or our own notions of mere ‘reasonableness.’ Such a doctrine waters 
down the First Amendment so that it amounts to little more than an admonition to Congress. 
The Amendment as so construed is not likely to protect any but those ‘safe’ or orthodox 
views which rarely need its protection.”). 
53 Id. 
54 Mark Tushnet, Abandoning Defensive Crouch Liberal Constitutionalism, BALKINIZATION 
(May 6, 2016, 1:15 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2016/05/abandoning-defensive-crouch-
liberal.html (“The culture wars are over; they lost, we won.”). 
55 Id. (“For liberals, the question now is how to deal with the losers in the culture wars. That’s 
mostly a question of tactics. My own judgment is that taking a hard line (‘You lost, live with 
it’) is better than trying to accommodate the losers, who – remember – defended, and are 
defending, positions that liberals regard as having no normative pull at all.”). 




Rather than carving out a space in pluralistic society for religious 
minorities to exercise their own autonomy within limited contexts, Professor 
Tushnet’s call to suppress minority religious views stems from a moral 
imperative to thwart opinions that he deems not only unsavory, but akin to 
historically epic evil, suggesting that “taking a hard line seemed to work 
reasonably well in Germany and Japan after 1945.”56 The rapid emergence of 
such a hard line attitude among some progressives is drawing a sharp rebuke 
from more pragmatic liberals. Fifty-eight gay marriage supporters recently 
wrote an open letter chiding gay marriage advocates who refuse to provide 
space for dissenting thinkers.57 
The highest vision of pluralism opts for protecting the liberty of each 
individual over the social value of protected equality in equal citizenship, or in 
the words of Professor West, our shared commitment to civil rights. Nobel 
laureate economist Milton Friedman famously summed up his preference for 
liberty by suggesting that societies valuing freedom over equality would achieve 
both, while those valuing equality over freedom would achieve neither.58  
In the context of religious organizations and their clash with our shared 
commitment to civil rights, Justice Samuel Alito articulated this robust vision 
of pluralism as protecting individual liberty in his Christian Legal Society v. 
Martinez dissenting opinion.59 The Christian Legal Society (CLS) chapter at 
Hastings College of Law required its leaders to be Christians themselves, and 
espouse the organization’s statement of faith. CLS also espoused a religious 
view that human sexuality is created for and properly limited to conjugal 
marriage between a man and woman, thus precluding a large number of 
sexually active students from leadership, including all LGBT students.  
Nothing in the trial or appellate records claim any particular student 
complained about the policy. The case presented no plaintiff who felt harassed 
or discriminated against, nor even a student who bothered to seek leadership in 
a religious group for a religion to which he or she did not belong. Nonetheless, 
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57 Inazu, supra note 35, at 590 (2015) (citing Freedom to Marry, Freedom to Dissent: Why 
We Must Have Both, REAL CLEAR POL. (Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.realclearpolitics.com/ 
articles/2014/04/22/freedom_to-marryfreedomto_dissentwhywemusthaveboth_1 
22376.html). 
58 MILTON FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT 148 (1980). The freedom-
equality debate extends well beyond the scope of this Comment, but Friedman’s argument 
stems largely from the success and opportunity of societies that protect liberty and property 
rights — such as modern western economies — as compared to societies that fixate on 
egalitarian outcomes, which is the ostensible goal of communist states. 
59 Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 
561 U.S. 661, 706 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 




Hastings Law maintained an “all-comers” policy requiring student groups to 
allow any student to pursue leadership positions, regardless of whether their 
own beliefs comport with the organization’s beliefs. The law school thus 
denied registration to a CLS chapter on campus, consequently withholding 
resources available to student organization. These resources included the 
ability to book campus facilities, receive institutional support, and request 
student fee money for events. The Ninth Circuit, and later the Supreme Court, 
upheld the law school’s decision as viewpoint-neutral and reasonable.60 
Justice Alito highlighted past inconsistencies in Hastings’s application 
of its “accept all-comers” policy, shedding light on the school’s potentially 
pretextual motives for citing the policy to deny CLS registration.61 But more 
importantly, he also painted a moral vision of pluralism as an alternative to the 
accept-all-comers approach. Justice Alito cited the record to argue that 
intellectual diversity should thrive organically among student organizations, 
not diversity within student organizations, artificially foisted upon them.62 
Justice Alito supported the “creation of a forum within which Hastings students 
are free to form and obtain registration of essentially the same broad range of 
private groups that nonstudents may form off campus.”63 In essence, Justice 
Alito believed that allowing a diverse collection of campus groups best 
reflected society’s diversity, rather than forcing each group to be a microcosm 
of societal diversity reflected within each group. 
His live-and-let-live view of pluralism acknowledges that people 
naturally seek association with others who share their moral and religious 
beliefs. Rather than fighting such voluntary associations, pluralism protects the 
rights of each one to operate freely by recognizing their right to exclude, or not 
associate with, those who disagree with them. Christian, Jewish, and Islamic 
organizations should then exist alongside LGBTQ organizations, each 
enjoying the freedom to select leaders holding certain religious or moral values. 
The live-and-let-live view also holds the unique advantage of being the non-
coercive conception of pluralism, as discussed later in this Comment. 
Professor John Inazu labels this thriving intellectual ecosystem as 
“confident pluralism.”64 Building on John Rawls’s “fact of pluralism,” Inazu 
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61 Martinez, 561 U.S. at 713 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting) (observing that the Hastings 
Democratic Caucus, Association of Trial Lawyers of America at Hastings, La Raza, and 
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62 Id. at 732-735. 
63 Id. at 729. 
64 Inazu, supra note 35, at 561-602. 




believes we must “embrace a right to differ from state and majoritarian norms.”65 
He roots this argument in two premises. First, confident pluralism reflects 
suspicion of state power, or what I previously called the non-coercive value.66 
These independent communities should be able to, in the words of William 
Eskridge, “flourish and wither as they may, and the state cannot as a normal 
matter become the means for the triumph of one community over all others.”67 
Second, Professor Inazu suggests that confident pluralism advances the 
aspiration of tolerance, humility, and patience better than government-mandated 
orthodoxy.68 Denying religious student groups the opportunity to select leaders 
by their own religious criteria may not feel like tolerance when it manifests 
exclusion, but we do not practice tolerance by imposing our own majoritarian 
values on their religious enclave without respect or tolerance for their faith.  
By supporting tolerance, humility, and patience, confident pluralism 
fosters “fruits of persuasion” between individuals on a personal level.69 
Students who do not accept the religious convictions of a religious group need 
not be in positions of leadership within that group to engage with the group’s 
ideas and develop personal relationships. In the case of LGBT rights, public 
opinion is shifting away from discrimination, even with the widespread 
presence of RFRA laws.70 This confidant pluralism maintains the authenticity 
of each autonomous community within the diverse society. Accordingly, it is 
the only vision of pluralism that respects the full dignitary interests of each 
group’s members, and the only vision that avoids using coercion to meet 
majoritarian norms. 
 
IV. THE BACKGROUND OF MODERN RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION CLAIMS 
  
Scholars attribute the spectrum of religious exemptions to modern 
social movements more than a unified legal theory.71 Those movements 
explain why religious organizations historically receive historically generous 
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67 Inazu, supra note 35, at 590 (quoting William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of 
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exemptions for sexual orientation but virtually no slack regarding racial 
nondiscrimination requirements.72 They also receive more exemptions than 
secular nonprofits.73 
 Religious convictions are not constitutionally entitled to exemptions 
from generally applicable laws.74 Instead, the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act of 1993 (RFRA) provides a federal statutory remedy to religious 
adherents.75 Under RFRA, the federal government76 may only substantially 
burden a person’s exercise of religion if it can 1) establish a compelling 
governmental interest, and 2) demonstrate that it used the least restrictive 
means of furthering that interest.77 Twenty-one states followed Congress by 
enacting their own RFRA laws to protect religious exercise from state law.78  
 The 1993 federal law passed the Senate by a 97-3 vote majority79 with 
the support of the American Civil Liberties Union at the time.80 In the 
following decades, most litigation invoking RFRA flew under the radar of 
public opinion. The statute cropped up, for example, to protect a Sikh woman’s 
right to carry religious objects in federal buildings81 and to ensure a Muslim 
prisoner could maintain a beard for religious reasons.82 But in the midst of these 
																																								 																				
72 See id., at 815-21 (teasing out the differences in doctrine surrounding religious exemptions 
and discrimination based on race, gender, and sexual orientation). 
73 See generally id. at 785 (citing Martha Minow, Partners, Not Rivals? Redrawing the Lines 
Between Public and Private, Non-Profit and Profit, and Secular and Religious, 80 B.U. L. 
REV. 1061, 1084 (2000)). 
74 Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Serv. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).  
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78 State Religious Freedom Acts, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Oct. 15, 2015), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx. 
79 H.R. 1308 (103rd): Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, GOVTRACK (last visited 
May 1, 2016), https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/103-1993/s331. 
80 In the aftermath of Hobby Lobby decision, the ACLU withdrew its support for RFRA 
legislation, concluding that its policy implications were no longer palatable for the 
organization’s political and ideological goals. See Louise Melling, ACLU: Why We Can No 
Longer Support the Federal ‘Religious Freedom’ Law, WASH. POST, June 25, 2015, http:// 
wpo.st/SSa_1 (“It’s time for Congress to amend the RFRA so that it cannot be used as a 
defense for discrimination.”). 
81 Tagore v. United States, 735 F.3d 324, 325-26 (5th Cir. 2013) (remanding the case for 
RFRA analysis on an IRS employee’s claim that security personnel discriminated against 
her by denying her the right to carry a symbolic ceremonial blade). 
82 Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859 (2015) (determining that the government’s policy 
substantially burdened the prisoner’s religious exercise). 




low-profile legal skirmishes, one case catapulted RFRA claims into a national 
debate about religious liberty — Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.83  
 In Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court considered claims by two 
families, the Greens and the Hahns,84 each of whom owned large family 
businesses that functioned as closely-held corporations.85 The decision’s critics 
balk at such personalized language — can a retail chain with over $1 billion in 
revenue be fairly considered a “family business”? I argue explicitly what Justice 
Alito implies in the majority opinion, namely, that a family’s moral duties do 
not bear an inverse relationship to profitability. When the state mandates 
behavior substantially burdening the family’s deeply-held religious beliefs, 
their culpability cannot rationally dissipate at any particular profit margin or 
workforce size. Instead, the dispositive factors as to RFRA’s applicability 
should be corporate structure and decision making. The Greens and Hahns had 
full power to set corporate policy and moral guidelines themselves, which 
would simply not be true in a publicly-held company of comparable size. 
Responsibility in a public company is distributed among public shareholders, 
each of whom lack the power to personally set policy. With regard to Hobby 
Lobby, the decision’s critics counter that even closely-held corporations receive 
tangible government benefits (tax incentives, access to marketplace protections, 
insulation from liability), and these benefits must only come in exchange for 
adherence to social responsibilities as expressed in generally applicable laws. 
That argument is a recurring narrative in religious exemption debates, but is not 
itself related to the size of any party in a RFRA claim. 
 Although popular press coverage continues to portray their claim as 
seeking to deny access to contraceptives,86 the Greens in fact provided health 
care coverage to their employees at Hobby Lobby stores, including sixteen 
different methods of FDA-approved birth control.87 The Greens declined, 
however, to provide four types of birth control, including ulipristal, which they 
argued could affect an embryo after fertilization, thus violating their religious 
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beliefs.88 The government did not challenge the validity of the Greens’ 
understanding of the drugs or their operation.89 Justice Alito’s opinion 
acknowledged that providing birth control was a compelling government 
interest, but faulted the government for failing to exercise the least restrictive 
means of furthering that interest.90 
 Hobby Lobby generated extensive media coverage, and with it, 
passionate public debate about RFRA laws generally. Their steady 
proliferation on the state level could no longer escape notice in the press. When 
Indiana introduced RFRA legislation modeled after the federal law, expanding 
it to provide a defense against private suits, the blowback was swift.91 
Businesses condemned the bill and revoked tens of millions of dollars from 
corporate investment in Indiana.92 Republican Governor Mike Pence even 
signed a subsequent clarification that the law did not protect businesses to deny 
services on the basis of sexual orientation.93 In the following weeks, Arkansas 
Governor Asa Hutchinson faced a similar dilemma. He ultimately signed the 
state’s RFRA law with a similar clarification.94 
 Two recent state laws offer an opportunity to contrast post-Hobby 
Lobby approaches to religious liberties legislation.95 Georgia and Mississippi 
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94 See Eric Bradner, Arkansas Governor Signs Amended 'Religious Freedom' Measure, CNN, 
Apr. 2, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/31/politics/arkansas-religious-freedom-anti-lgbt-bill/ 
(“[Hutchinson] asked lawmakers to recall the law that the Arkansas House had given final 
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both passed religious liberties protections. Governor Nathan Deal vetoed the 
Georgia bill, while Governor Phil Bryant signed the Mississippi measure into 
law. Rather than simply accepting or rejecting religious exemptions across the 
board, these state examples offer an opportunity to contrast approaches. Their 
contrast underscores how drastically the scope of religious liberties legislation 
can vary state-by-state. 
 




 In Georgia, social conservatives passed legislation to strengthen the 
religious exit rights of ministers, religious organizations, and private 
individuals.96 Critics quickly labeled it a license to discriminate, going beyond 
innocuous religious liberties protection and permitting businesses to deny 
service to LGBT customers.97 As purported compromises, supporters removed 
explicit protection for businesses and clarified that the bill would “not be used 
to allow discrimination banned by federal or state law.”98  
 These attempts at conciliation, however, did little to stem the growing 
tide of criticism directed at the bill.99 Local institutions ranging from 
professional sports franchises to the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce balked, 
major companies threatened to divert investment away from Georgia, and the 
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state’s business-friendly Republican governor grew nervous.100 Eventually, 
Governor Nathan Deal vetoed the bill, thus triggering threats from the legis-
lature to introduce a similar measure again the following year.101  
 Amid all the controversy, how much did the Georgia bill actually differ 
from longstanding federal law? As discussed above, the federal RFRA law 
simply established a two-prong process for reviewing religious liberty challen-
ges: compelling governmental interest and least restrictive means.102 The 
Georgia bill, by contrast, waded deeper into specific hot-button issues.  
 It first provides religious ministers with a general right to decline 
participation in any marriage ceremony for religious reasons.103 This provision 
is hardly novel, and exists in other states without such heated controversy.104  
 Second, the bill pivoted to the commercial sector to insulate business 
and industry from any legal requirement to work on religious days of rest, 
specifically the Judeo-Christian Saturday or Sunday.105 It seems at least plaus-
ible that this provision would be vulnerable to a constitutional challenge on the 
grounds that it favors Christianity and Judaism over other religions by singling 
out Saturday and Sunday as days of rest. Such a claim is, however, outside the 
scope of this Comment.106  
 Third, the bill reinforced the autonomy of churches and faith-based 
organizations to exercise discretionary control of their facilities, protecting 
them against liability if they deny access to some people on the basis of religious 
convictions.107 Religious conservatives are concerned that growing acceptance 




102 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012) (“Government may substantially burden a person's exercise 
of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person (1) is in 
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of 
furthering that compelling governmental interest.”). 
103 Georgia Bill, supra note 96 (“All individuals who are ministers of the gospel or clerics or 
religious practitioners . . . shall be free to solemnize any marriage . . . or to decline to do the 
same, in their discretion, in the exercise of their rights to free exercise of religion . . . .”). 
104 See, e.g., FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 8, at 174 (“Religious clergy [in New York] 
continue to enjoy constitutional freedom not to perform marriages that offend their religious 
beliefs.”). 
105 Georgia Bill, supra note 96 (“No business or industry shall be required by ordinance or 
resolution of any county, municipality, or consolidated government to operate on either of 
the two rest days (Saturday or Sunday).”). 
106 See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 703 (1994) 
(“[G]overnment should not prefer one religion to another, or religion to irreligion.”). 
107 Georgia Bill, supra note 96 (“No faith based organization shall be required to rent, lease, 
or otherwise grant permission for property to be used by another person for an event which 
is objectionable to such faith based organization.”). 




organizations, if not churches themselves, in ceremonies they find morally 
objectionable on religious grounds.108  
 Fourth, the Georgia bill introduced general RFRA language requiring 
a compelling governmental interest and least restrictive means in order to sub-
stantially burden a person’s exercise of religion.  The bill did not extend any 
protection to public employees, such as county clerks or other local magistrates 
to deny marriage licenses on a religious basis.109 
 On the whole, the Georgia bill text itself did not amount to “legalized 
discrimination” about which the critics and alarmists warned.110 The Georgia 
legislature confined the bill’s scope to focus on religious organizations and 
individuals, not public officials or corporations.111 One exception is the 
weekend holiday provision, which seems to be the most disjointed of the bill’s 
sections. Aside from that requirement, the bill protects the sovereignty of 
religious individuals and organizations within their own spheres. Can religious 
liberty have any meaningful application if it does not include permitting 
religious groups to associate among themselves freely by hiring under their own 
criteria, or have facilities that may be used according to their religious beliefs? 
 These are exit rights, to be sure. But they provide an exit from 
majoritarian social norms to preserve distinct religious expression. Far from 
undermining our social fabric, these rights foster authentic religious commun-
ities. Freed from state coercion in hiring decisions and imposition of majoritarian 
rules about which religious ceremonies they must officiate, individuals can 
instead contribute to a diverse tapestry of religious communities. This pluralism 
of diverse groups allows each to thrive, as opposed to top-down imposition of 
pluralism within each group. 
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 Mississippi upped the ante, enacting H.B. 1523, titled the “Protecting 
Freedom of Conscience from Government Discrimination Act.”112 The law 
protects not religious views in general, but rather those religious or moral views 
specifically related to sexuality and marriage.113 Inclusion of moral rather than 
strictly religious views is significant, because the First Amendment may 
protect religious liberty more strongly than other moral convictions.114  
 Moving past the standard RFRA language of compelling governmental 
interests and least restrictive means (which Mississippi adopted in 2014),115 the 
new law reframed debate by prohibiting the government from “tak[ing] any 
discriminatory action against a religious organization” in a variety of ways.116 
By focusing on religious organizations as sympathetic characters, thus casting 
them as victims rather than perpetrators of discrimination, the legislature mirrors 
the rhetorical strategy of social conservatives in the gay marriage debates.117 
Governor Phil Bryant signed the bill into law under that justification. Critics, by 
contrast, lambasted state lawmakers for enabling “open discrimination” against 
gay citizens.118 In June 2016, a federal judge struck down the law for violating 
the Establishment Clause and Equal Protection Clause.119 
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 As for specific provisions, the law first builds on its marriage focus by 
specifically protecting those who provide “services, accommodations, facilities, 
goods or privileges” related to marriage against government action for declining 
involvement in that marriage.120 It later grants specific legal protection for goods 
and services such as wedding florists, photographers, and bakers — ancillary 
marriage services in the battleground of current litigation.121  
 Second, the law provides a liability shield for religious organizations in 
their hiring decisions.122 Religious organizations already enjoy a First 
Amendment ministerial protection against employment litigation, but the excep-
tion is limited to ministers—not necessarily all employees of a religious 
organization.123 Nor does a blanket protection for moral convictions necessarily 
equate to RFRA’s requirement of religious exercise. In Hosanna-Tabor, Chief 
Justice John Roberts rooted part of the majority opinion in the relationship of 
ministers to their congregation, a distinctly religious structure.124  
 Third, the law explicitly protects the rights of adoptive parents to teach 
their children consistent with the parents’ sincerely held religious or moral 
beliefs, presumably even if some people find those beliefs discriminatory.125  
 Fourth, the law prohibits state action against adoptive and foster parents 
on the basis that they refuse on a religious or moral basis to facilitate their 
child’s gender transition or sex reassignment.126  
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124 Id. at 706 (“The members of a religious group put their faith in the hands of their ministers. 
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 Fifth, the law codifies the rights of individuals to reject access of trans-
gender individuals to locker rooms and bathrooms of the non-birth gender with 
which they identify.127  
 Sixth, the law sides with state employees who engage in “expressive 
conduct” based on their religious beliefs, with some time, place, and manner 
restriction allowed.128 The full scope of what “expressive conduct” encom-
passes remains unclear.  
 Seventh, the law allows for recusal by public officials with religious or 
moral convictions against issuing a marriage license.129 While the law attempts 
to avoid a Kim Davis-style conflict by requiring public offices to “take all 
necessary steps” to ensure the marriage is solemnized without delay, it remains 
unclear which side would win in a head-on conflict.130 If all clerks in an office 
refuse to sign a marriage license for a gay couple, can the entire office claim 
an exemption, or does the “all necessary steps” provision require one of them 
to set aside their religious objection?   
The sweeping provisions of H.B. 1523 stand in marked contrast to 
Georgia, and bear almost no resemblance to RFRA laws in Arkansas and 
Indiana.131 Conceivably, we have lost sensitivity to the nuances of each bill 
because the critics are just as loud every time, and the supporters’ justifications 
sound remarkably the same every time.132 The protestors and sensationalists in 
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Indiana and Arkansas may have inoculated the press and the public against 
their warnings. By labeling fairly tepid bills as “legalized discrimination”133 — 
even measures formerly supported by the ACLU — critics who truly 
understood the Mississippi bill’s ramifications could no longer turn the volume 
up any higher. They lacked rhetorical space to escalate their warnings for bills 
that actually did pose a greater threat to their interests. 
 Mississippi exceeded the scope of Georgia, Indiana, and Arkansas by 
providing explicit protection to government workers who refuse to perform 
their duties if they conflict with religious beliefs.134 This alters the relationship 
of religious exemptions to the state, and exceeds the bounds of any potential 
live-and-let-live compromise. The open-ended protection of religious 
“expressive conduct” by state employees is even more concerning. We have 
no reference point to understand what that means. Time, place, and manner 
restrictions are malleable concepts, open to recurring litigation, and state court 
judges in Mississippi may not be prone to rule against the time, place, and 
manner of religious expression. Consequently, this provision alone could open 
the most far-reaching Pandora’s box of dignitary harms to LGBT residents, 
sanctioning state employees in an undefined set of actions that could deny 
equal citizenship to the very taxpayers they are commissioned to serve. 
 Further, the state created another potentially broad cause of action by 
adoptive parents. By barring state action against adoptive parents on the basis 
of the parents’ beliefs about gender, the state could invite lawsuits if it declines 
to place a child with gender dysphoria in a family whose parents reject the 
existence of such a condition. Parents could then potentially sue to have a child 
placed in their home, and the state could not legally consider the family’s 
attitude toward gender when determining the suitability of their home. 
 Challengers succeeded at the trial court level by winning an injunction 
against the enforcement of HB 1523.135 U.S. District Court Judge Carlton 
Reeves ruled that HB 1523 violated the Establishment Clause because “the 
State has put its thumb on the scale to favor some religious beliefs over 
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others.”136 The Court also found animus against LGBT residents motivating the 
law, which could not comport with the Equal Protection Clause in light of 
Romer v. Evans137 and United States v. Windsor.138 Judge Reeves also noted 
that the law did “not place any duty on the recusing individual to ensure that 
LGBT citizens receive services.”139 
 The Mississippi law’s provisions underscore how each state’s approach 
to religious exemptions can be wholly different when assessing these laws. 
Critics should carefully weigh their language to evaluate whether their dire 
warnings are overstated. Supporters should resist the urge to go for a “total 
win” in conservative states like Mississippi, and instead recognize that they 
would not take kindly to Professor Tushnut adopting their tactics to implement 
the opposing policy preferences. 
 
VI. THE PROBLEM OF RACE 
 
 Most discussions of religious liberties exemptions arrive at the same 
sticky wicket: what would an exemption advocate say to a white supremacist 
group that seeks a religious exemption from the Civil Rights Act? How can 
the advocate of religious liberties reconcile the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Bob Jones with its decision in Hobby Lobby? In Bob Jones, the Supreme 
Court ruled that the IRS did not violate the religious liberty of a hyper-
conservative Christian college when it denied tax exempt status because the 
school maintained racially discriminatory policies, including a policy against 
interracial dating.140 By the time Bob Jones reached the Supreme Court, it 
focused on favorable tax treatment as a subsidy rather than behavior 
compelled by threat of punishment.141 Many religious exemption claims do 
not stem from such tax issues, although tax-exempt churches could conceiv-
ably be a focus of litigation. 
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 All Americans analyzing the law must wrestle carefully with race. As 
Professor Inazu points out, race is unique as an institution in American 
history.142 Its unparalleled influence in America, along with its interplay with 
centuries of systematic and open discrimination in the Jim Crow South, warrant 
its own category of analysis. Without a doubt, LGBT Americans have suffered 
at the hand of discrimination since the earliest days of the republic. Despite the 
legacy of that injustice, it cannot be compared to methodical abduction, sale, 
and trafficking of millions of people across continents. Lack of social respect 
and workplace discrimination influence opportunities and underscore the need 
for equal citizenship. They do not, however, constitute an analog to centuries 
of open violence, a Constitutionally-established inferiority for over 50 years, 
and open, unmistakable identification with a marginalized group. That is certain-
ly different from any “new majority” today, against whom religious claimants 
often seek relief. 
 These factors make the LGBT movement distinct from race among 
discreet and insular minorities. They do not, under any circumstance, mitigate 
or denigrate the real struggle facing LGBT communities in a post-Obergefell 
world—particularly for LGBT youth, who suffer from social ostracizing and 
higher suicide rates than other students.143 As a result, simply saying “race is 
different” may be an emotionally unfulfilling answer. But it is inescapably 
consistent with our institutional history and constitutional culture. This a reason 
similar to why courts evaluate racial equal protection claims differently than 
other equal protection claims, not even applying the same standard of review. 
Of course, simply acknowledging America’s distinct racial history does not 
automatically answer how potential religious claims about race should be 
analyzed. Nor does that acknowledgment necessitate any standard about 
religious claims regarding sexual orientation or same-sex marriages. But our 
racial history may inform just how compelling an interest the state has in racial 
nondiscrimination protections, and their extended political history may 
indicate how difficult it would be for lawmakers to tailor them more narrowly. 
 The special need for racial nondiscrimination protections is also 
corroborated by even the arch-libertarian himself, Professor Richard Epstein, 
who emphasizes the Civil Rights Act confronted an unprecedented system of 
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private discrimination matched with violence, a systematically unfair legal 
systems, state-sanctioned discrimination and cronyism, along with a host of 
other threats not analogous to any factor other than race.144 
 The other potential answer appeals to the nature of religious beliefs. 
Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, among other religious traditions propagate 
sexual morality in some fashion. Under most traditional Christian creeds, 
churches interpreted the Bible to restrict sexual conduct to marriage. They also 
taught marriage as a conjugal institution between men and women. These 
teachings received, at various times, widespread support among clergy, 
theologians, and practicing Christians. Racial discrimination received a safe 
harbor in some southern churches, but may not have been a globally dominant 
religious tenant akin to sexual morality. The absolute lack of racist organ-
izations currently seeking religious exemptions may offer some evidence of 
this position. 
 This second answer seems plausible, but legally weak as a distin-
guishing factor between race and gender identity. Courts consistently avoid 
ruling on the validity of religious beliefs, and for good reason — it’s hard to 
embrace pluralism and preach religious liberty if the state effectively exercises 
veto power over what is and what is not truly a religious belief.145 Trial courts 
might be able to find evidence of pretext to say that racist beliefs are not 
sincerely held, but in a close case, a court might struggle to articulate why it’s 
an inferior religious belief. 
 In general, such line-drawing problems rarely arise because most people 
without a religious exemption don’t seek one. In the event they did, the entirely 
one-of-a-kind nature of racial discrimination sets it apart as entailing separate 
nondiscrimination policies with independent justifications for their measures. 
The compelling governmental interest is so strong and unique that there is no 
way to sufficiently tailor means around objections, religious or otherwise. 
 
VII. THE WAY FORWARD 
 
 In the spirit of liberty, the live-and-let-live solution is the only one that 
adopts a robust view of vibrant pluralism and properly embraces mutual 
adjustment. One promising example of such a compromise originated in Utah, 
where socially conservative Mormon leaders coalesced around a bill to ban 
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discrimination against LGBT citizens.146 The law added sexual orientation and 
gender identity to protected classes such as race and gender.147 In exchange, 
the bill exempted religious organizations and their auxiliary bodies.148  
 Even so, not everyone is happy. Religious leaders fear the protections 
are insufficiently strong because the law does not protect the wedding 
photographers and cake bakers protected by Mississippi and Georgia.149 Russell 
Moore, a prominent social conservative who heads the Southern Baptist 
Convention’s Ethics and Religious Liberties Commission, warns that antidis-
crimination ordinances are “not the right tactic” for Christians, preferring to 
assert a positive freedom of conscience.150 Nor does the law placate ardent 
progressive advocates, who see such compromise ordinances as a Trojan horse 
for religious conservative values.151 Crucially, the bill’s final version omitted 
public accommodations protections. LGBT citizens are therefore protected in 
employment and other settings, but not interactions with businesses, restaurants, 
and other public accommodations. Many states currently have no protections 
against public accommodation discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, 
and contra warnings about state RFRA laws ushering in a new era of Jim Crow, 
public accommodations are not generally the hotbed of LGBT discrimination. 
Instead, in states like Washington with strong antidiscrimination protections for 
LGBT citizens, litigated cases center on narrow and discrete jobs that participate 
in same-sex weddings, like bakers and photographers, not restaurants or hotels 
refusing to serve LGBT customers.152 Naturally this does not disprove the need 
for nondiscrimination legislation, and certainly does not support a claim that it 
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is unwise policy. The consideration is only relevant to consider that equality 
advocates should consider praising Utah’s incremental progress, and recognize 
that the civil rights threat may be overstated. 
 Sometimes the best compromises fail to satisfy everyone. If we could 
set the clock back ten years, it’s difficult to envisage a world where LGBT 
advocates would not be thrilled to learn that the Mormon church in 2016 would 
embrace nondiscrimination protections in a state where gay marriage is legal. 
We should not, however, let the good serve as the enemy of the best, so it is 
important to understand that this framework (if not every aspect of the Utah 
compromise negotiation) has intrinsic value. Live-and-let-live solutions can 
follow the Utah model to embrace three key elements: 1) general nondiscrim-
ination protections for LGBT citizens; 2) adequate protections for religious 
individuals and organizations in the form of a RFRA analysis; and 3) protection 
for equal citizenship that only uses governmental coercion as a last resort, after 




 Religious liberty claims enjoy a rich history that extends far beyond 
political compromises and pragmatism. America’s shared commitment to 
pluralism requires us to respect the dignity within each enclave of religious 
society. Our policymakers cannot offer that respect if they adopt the alternative 
view of pluralism, which tries to replicate the composition of society writ large 
within each religious enclave. Nor can they respect a vibrant pluralism if the 
government’s interest in protecting a shared social commitment to entry rights 
overrides liberty of conscience for each religious group. Instead, policymakers 
should acknowledge the dignitary interests undermined by state intervention. 
Governments must respect the autonomy of religious practice for individuals 
and religious organizations.  
 Such a vibrant pluralism creates space for a live-and-let-live provision 
of equal citizenship as well. Before coercing religious believers to participate 
in activity against their religious convictions, the government should be 
obligated to explore less restrictive means of accomplishing its objective. 
Harassing the lone photographer whose religion objects to same-sex marriage 
may advance goals of a shared social commitment to equal rights — or not, it 
might only provoke blowback. Either way, it certainly does not advance vibrant 
pluralism. Nor does it acknowledge that both parties have dignitary interests, 
but only one seeks to enforce theirs with the power of government force. 
 Keeping with these commitments, states can learn from the dangers of 
Mississippi and the strengths of Utah to craft new live-and-let-live solutions. 
These solutions need not implicate concerns about racial discrimination or 




defining sincere religious beliefs. Instead, they can boldly assert a moral high 
ground of liberty. It may not be a universally popular solution, but from the 
earliest Madisonian experiments, liberty of conscience has proven to be a 
durable brand. When religious liberty can protect both personal conscience and 
equal citizenship, we’re reminded what a triumph of liberalism it remains. 
 
 
 
 
 
